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Historical 
Prevalence and 
Distribution of 
Avian Influenza 
Virus A(H7N9) 
among Wild Birds
Sarah H. Olson, Martin Gilbert, Ming Chu Cheng, 
Jonna A.K. Mazet, and Damien O. Joly
We	examined	48	published	studies	 for	which	sample	
sizes	could	be	ascertained	 to	determine	 the	historic	prev-
alence	of	 influenza	A(H7N9)	virus	 in	wild	bird	populations	
and	reviewed	GenBank	data	to	further	establish	its	distribu-
tion.	Low	prevalence	(0.0093%)	in	Asia	suggests	>	30,000	
samples	would	be	required	to	detect	the	H7N9	subtype	in	
wild	birds.
Beginning in February 2013, and ongoing at publica-tion of this article, infections with the zoonotic virus, 
influenza A(H7N9), have caused serious illness in humans 
in provinces of southeastern China. On April 4, the China 
Animal Disease Control Centre announced that the virus 
had been detected in samples collected from a pigeon and 
chickens at a market in Shanghai (1,2). On April 17, the vi-
rus was detected in a sample from a wild pigeon in Nanjing, 
Jiangsu Province (3). Chen et al. concluded that humans 
were infected by domestic birds (1); no human-to-human 
transmission was detected or suspected (4). The structure 
of the hemagglutinin (HA) protein in the virus and the lack 
of reports of severe disease in poultry indicate that the virus 
exhibits characteristics of low pathogenicity in birds (5,6). 
Recent phylogenetic analysis indicates that the HA seg-
ment of the H7N9 subtype is closely related to a strain that 
was isolated from domestic ducks in Zhejiang, China, in 
2011. The neuraminidase (NA) gene of the H7N9 subtype 
is closely related to that of a strain that was isolated from 
wild bird samples in South Korea in a location adjacent to 
a domestic bird production facility; additionally, 6 internal 
genes are closely related to those of an A(H9N2) virus iso-
lated from a brambling (Fringilla montifringilla) sample 
during 2012 in Beijing, China (7,8).
Little information exists on the status of A(H7N9) virus 
in wild birds to assess their potential as sources of human in-
fection and disseminators of the virus to new areas. Here we 
report the historic distribution and prevalence of H7N9 sub-
types among wild birds preceding this outbreak. This subtype 
was not known to cause disease in humans until the outbreak 
during February in China. We also examine the prevalence of 
individual H7, N9, and H9N2 subtypes in Asia. Finally, we 
estimate the sample size necessary to detect this low pathoge-
nicity strain of avian influenza virus in wild birds.
The Study
To determine prevalence of H7, N9, H7N9, and H9N2 
subtypes, we reviewed 48 peer-reviewed avian influenza 
surveillance studies in which sample sizes were stated and 
subtypes were nonselectively detected by using sequence 
analysis, reverse transcription PCR, or hemagglutination 
inhibition and neuraminidase inhibition assays. Data from 
these studies are summarized in the online Technical Appen-
dix (wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/19/12/13-0649-Techapp1.
pdf). These included 9 studies conducted in Asia, 12 in Eu-
rope, 4 in Africa, 3 in Australia, 17 in North America, and 
3 in Latin America. Extended datasets from peer-reviewed 
studies in Mongolia and Taiwan were provided by M. Gil-
bert and M.C. Cheng, respectively. The studies sampled 
birds during 1976–2012.
To further establish the geographic distribution of 
known H7N9 subtypes, we reviewed GenBank records 
downloaded on April 26, 2013, for HA or NA segments 
isolated from birds (9). We included a partially sequenced 
HA gene (1,676 bp [GenBank accession no. JN244232]) 
from A/wild bird/Korea/A3/2011 in our comparison (Ta-
ble) after evaluating the published phylogenetic trees (8).
Apparent prevalence was calculated as the (no. posi-
tive samples)/(no. tested) × 100%. The regional estimate 
for Asia was an unweighted calculation based on the sum 
of all positive samples and all tested birds, irrespective of 
detection biases that may have arisen from different wild 
bird surveillance systems. We determined the minimum 
sample size to detect at least 1 positive sample based on a 
0.05 level of significance (10)
Influenza H7N9 subtypes have been identified among 
wild birds globally (but not necessarily sequenced or sub-
mitted to GenBank) by isolation and by using reverse 
transcription PCR. The H7N9 subtype has been reported 
among wild birds from Delaware (USA)/Alberta (Canada), 
Guatemala, Spain, Sweden, Egypt, Mongolia, and Taiwan 
(online Technical Appendix Table 1). In these 48 studies, 
subtype H7N9 has not been detected in wild birds in these 
locations in Asia: Russia (combined sample size 7,353), 
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Japan (4,335), South Korea (28,214), or China (158) (on-
line Technical Appendix Table 2); furthermore, when sub-
type H7N9 was detected in Asia, its prevalence was low 
(online Technical Appendix Table 2).
In countries within Asia, <0.1% of samples from wild 
birds tested positive for any H7 subtype; <0.05% tested 
positive for any N9 subtype; <0.01% tested positive for 
an H7N9 strain, and <0.02% tested positive for an H9N2 
strain (online Technical Appendix Table 2). Assuming an 
apparent prevalence of 0.01%, we estimate that >30,000 
birds would have to be sampled to detect 1 bird that was 
H7N9-positive with a 95% probability. To similarly detect 
1 bird that was positive for H7, N9, or the H9N2 subtype  in 
Asia, >4,000, 7,000, or 19,000 samples from birds, respec-
tively, would be required.
Since 1988, the HA- and NA-producing genes of avian 
influenza subtype H7N9 have been deposited in GenBank 
12 times, mainly representing isolates collected from wild 
bird hosts (Table). In Asia, before this outbreak, an H7N9 
strain was sequenced from a wild bird in South Korea that 
was sampled during 2011 in a migratory bird habitat adja-
cent to duck farms (7) and also during 2011 in a sample from 
a mallard duck of unknown status from Japan. In 2008, the 
other H7N9 strain sequences collected in Asia were from a 
wild duck that was sampled in South Korea and from a wild 
bird sampled in Mongolia. All virus sequences were ob-
tained from ducks and domestic geese, with the exception 
of a chicken in China and the following from birds in the 
United States: a turkey in Minnesota, a guinea fowl in Ne-
braska, and ruddy turnstones (Arenaria interpres) sampled 
in Delaware during 1995 and 2000. Eight of the complete 
HA and NA genetic sequences are attributed to wild birds, 
3 are attributed to domestic birds, and 1 is attributed to a 
bird that could not be identified as wild or domestic be-
cause insufficient information was available.
Conclusions
Variation in the methods used in each study makes a 
precise calculation of H7N9 subtype prevalence in all wild 
birds impossible to determine, but given the available data, 
we conclude that the occurrence of the H7N9 subtype in 
wild bird populations is rare. We also conclude that sample 
sizes adequate to detect the virus among wild birds will be 
in the tens of thousands. Publishing the sample size and 
genus and species of wild birds tested in China will pro-
vide a better estimate of the prevalence among these birds 
related to this outbreak, especially because wild song birds 
have been hypothesized to be a possible reservoir (11). 
Wild birds are recorded as the predominant source of H7N9 
sequences, but this may be an outcome of sampling bias. 
Because virologists typically focus on highly pathogenic 
strains in humans and domestic birds, and an H7N9 sub-
type was not recognized as highly pathogenic, the H7N9 
strains were not was not tested for as frequently in wild 
birds. The HA/NA subtype concept we used for this analy-
sis is archaic, omitting the contributions of internal protein 
genes to the biology of a virus; unfortunately, it is the only 
widespread typing system available for influenza viruses. 
Subsequently, the best historic prevalence estimate of the 
circulating internal genes is based on the H9N2 subtype.
Infection with the H7N9 subtype may prove challeng-
ing to control by culling birds, because infected domestic 
flocks may be asymptomatic. In wild bird populations, 
low pathogenicity strains are likely to be sustained longer 
than highly pathogenic strains, which have been unable to 
persist in wild populations in the absence of introductions 
Table.	GenBank	nucleotide	sequences	of	H7N9	samples,	country	of	origin,	hosts, and	wild	or domesticated	status*	 
HA	GenBank	
accession	no. 
NA	GenBank	
accession	no. Year Host	(family/genus/species) Location Status 
KC899669 KC899671 2013 Chicken	(Gallus gallus) China Domestic 
GU060482 GU060484 2009 Goose	(Anatidae) Czech	Republic Domestic 
HQ244415 HQ244417 2009 Goose	(Anatidae) Czech	Republic Domestic 
CY067670 CY067672 2008 Blue-winged	teal	(Anas discors) Guatemala Wild 
CY067678 CY067680 2008 Blue-winged	teal	(Anas discors) Guatemala Wild 
AB813056 ND 2011 Mallard	(Anas platyrhynchos) Japan Unknown 
AB481212 AB481213 2008 Wild	duck	(Anatidae) Mongolia Wild 
JN244232† JN244223 2011 Wild	bird South	Korea Wild 
ND JX679164 2008 Wild	duck	(Anatidae) South	Korea Wild 
HQ244409 HQ244407 2008 Common	teal	(Anas creccca) Spain Wild 
AY999981 ND 2002 Mallard	(Anas platyrhynchos) Sweden Wild 
CY024818 CY024820 2006 Blue-winged	teal	(Anas discors) USA,	Ohio Wild 
JX899805 ND 2011 Goose	(Anatidae) USA,	Nebraska Unknown 
JX899803 ND 2011 Guinea	fowl	(Galliformes) USA,	Nebraska Domestic 
CY133649 CY133651 2011 Northern	shoveler	(Anas clypeata) USA,	Mississippi Wild 
EU684261 ND 2000 Ruddy	turnstone	(Arenaria interpres) USA,	Delaware Wild 
CY127253 CY127255 1995 Ruddy	turnstone	(Arenaria interpres) USA,	Delaware Wild 
CY014786 CY014788 1988 Turkey	(Meleagris spp.) USA,	Minnesota Wild/domestic‡ 
*HA,	hemagglutinin	sequence;	NA,	neuraminidase	sequence;	ND,	no	data	were	available	for	this	variable. 
†Partial sequence. 
‡Insufficient information was provided to determine status.  
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from a domestic reservoir (12). Further research should 
focus on identifying sequences within the new H7N9 ge-
nome that are linked to increased human pathogenicity 
and transmissibility and on conducting surveillance to de-
tect these markers in viruses carried by both domestic and 
wild birds (13).
In summary, we present evidence that wild bird 
surveillance for the novel influenza A(H7N9) virus will 
require large sample sizes. Given the low likelihood of 
detection, risk-based surveillance is recommended. Rul-
ing out wild birds as a continuing source of infection for 
domestic birds or humans will be critical to informing 
strategies to control the spread of this emerging zoo-
notic disease.
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